Ukraine is ramping up its counter-offensive just as the US announces it has completed wordage of 31 M1 Abrams tanks superiority of schedule.   Ukrainian tank crews who have trained on the M1 with American troops in Germany have moreover returned to take up the fighting.  In light of these events, we are reposting this vendible on the utilization of main wrestle tanks on the Ukrainian front lines.

Earlier this year, the German government spoken it would initially transfer 14 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine and indulge other NATO allies to likewise transfer Leopard 2s to Ukraine. This utterance represented the conclusion of months of wrangling between NATO members over the transfer of high-end main wrestle tanks to Ukraine.

On the same day, the Biden wardship spoken it would transfer 31 Abrams main wrestle tanks to Ukraine in an emergency aid package worth $400 million. The Biden wardship personal Ukraine could expect to receive “hundreds” of tanks. No remoter details were provided at the time.

Also in January, the British government pledged 14 Challenger 2 tanks for Ukraine.

On April 14, the Canadian defense minister spoken Canada has completed wordage of eight Leopard 2A4 tanks to Poland, for transfer to Ukraine.

Ever since these announcements, the whole of the defense-related punditry worldwide has been focused on the technological sophistication of the Leopard 2, M1 Abrams, and Challenger 2 in comparison to the Russian tanks they will squatter in Ukraine. In doing so, the defense pundits and shay quarterbacks fall into a trap, missing the increasingly fundamental impact of training and tactics on success in armored warfare on the modern battlefield.

That the Abrams, Challenger 2, and Leopard 2 are technologically superior to their Russian-made counterparts is unmistakably vastitude dispute.

Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. Army expended considerable time, effort, and malaise searching for the wordplay to a singular question: Could the M1 Abrams survive versus Soviet main wrestle tanks in a force-on-force engagement? At the time, the Soviet tank gravity consisted primarily of T-64, T-72, and T-80 (a gas turbine-powered minutiae of the T-64) main wrestle tanks. The T-64, T-72, and T-80 share a number of worldwide vital diamond elements and are equivalent in terms of gainsay sufficiency and survivability.

In 1991, without a mere 100 hours of ground gainsay in Iraq, we learned conclusively that not only could the M1A1 Abrams survive, but that the Iraqi T-72s were simply not plane in the same league as the Abrams and the British Challenger. During Operation Desert Storm, the Abrams and Challenger proved capable of engaging and destroying T-72s vastitude the range of the T-72’s 125mm 2A64M main gun, enabling American and British tank crews to pick off T-72s at long range with impunity. In fact, an FV4034 Challenger achieved a skiver at over 5,100 meters (5,577.4 yd, or 3.17 mi), the uttermost known tank-versus-tank skiver in history.

In tropical combat, the T-72 fared no better. Abrams and Challenger crews engaged, maneuvered against, and defeated T-72s faster than the Iraqi tank crews could react. During the wrestle of 73 Easting (February 26, 1991), elements of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, including approximately 36 M1A1 Abrams tanks, defeated two Iraqi armored brigades in tropical combat. In the battle, the 2nd ACR lost no Abrams tanks and only one M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle to enemy fire. The Iraqi Army lost 160 tanks, 180 personnel carriers, 12 artillery pieces, and 80 wheeled vehicles.

Clearly, facing an American Abrams or British Challenger in a Russian-made T-72 proved little largest than bringing a pocketknife to a gun fight.

Fast forward three decades . . .

The tank gravity of the Russian Army invading Ukraine consists primarily of T-72, T-80, and T-90 tanks. The T-90 is substantially a late-model T-72 hull and turret, integrating the newer V-84 MS diesel engine and the wide turret components of the latest T-80U. Open-source reporting indicates tank losses in Ukraine are compelling the Russian Army to retrofit plane older T-62 tanks for gainsay service. With the introduction of Challenger 2s, Leopard 1s, Leopard 2s, and M1A1 Abrams into Ukrainian Army service, Russian Army tank crews in Ukraine may find themselves at an plane greater disadvantage.

But technology vacated is not the key to modern armored warfare. How these tanks are employed tactically is, and unchangingly will be, the key factor. And so, we must squint vastitude technology to tactical doctrine, training, and employment.

In terms of tactical doctrine and training, the Russian and Ukrainian armies are branches of the same tree, inheritors of the same Soviet Red Army heritage. As such, their worldwide doctrine for tank warfare was shaped by the pioneering tactics of Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. Zhukov’s doctrine employed tank forces as a monolithic mobile sledgehammer – hey, diddle diddle, straight up the middle; amash anything in your way. Russian tank diamond reflects this tactical philosophy.

Western tank tactical doctrine, on the other hand, is grounded in a cavalry-based philosophy – move fast, strike hard. Don’t requite the enemy a endangerment to powerfully react. Where the Russians squint to Zhukov for inspiration, the Western armies squint to Heinz Guderian, Erwin Rommel, and that most magnificent cavalryman of all, George S. Patton. Western tank diamond reflects this tactical philosophy, with its accent on the speed and maneuverability of the platform, combined with the situational sensation and tactical initiative of the crew.

In Ukraine, if the Leopards, Challengers, and Abrams are employed with crews and commanders well-grounded in Western armored warfare doctrine, the impact on the battleground will be devastating for Russian forces. But if Ukrainian forces try to employ these Western tanks equal to their existing Soviet-style doctrine, the results on the battleground will be mixed at best, disastrous at worst.

Ukrainian personnel must be trained to operate, maintain, and powerfully employ these tanks. That level of training simply does not happen overnight. Plane the most sophisticated weapon in the world is utterly useless in untrained (or poorly trained) hands.

Technology does not win battles. Properly trained soldiers win battles. To ignore that rememberable reality is to invite disaster and defeat.